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I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been appreciated that the property right contained in
a patent grant is not limited to the literal scope of the claims. Courts
have recognized that such a limitation would allow (even encourage)
piracy of inventions and confound the goals of the patent system.'
Instead, under the doctrine of equivalents, a patent holder's property
rights may be expanded beyond the literal scope of the patent claims
to include products and processes that differ in only unimportant and
* Copyright © 1996 Ted Apple.
t J.D., 1996, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Ph.D., 1989, University
of California, Berkeley. Mr. Apple is an associate at the law firm of Townsend and Townsend
and Crew, where he specializes in prosecution of biotechnology-related patents.
1. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
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insubstantial ways from the claimed invention. 2 The application of
the doctrine of equivalents has presented difficult problems for both
the courts 3 and for practitioners who counsel clients attempting to de-
sign around an existing patent or seeking patent protection for a new
invention.4
When a patentee asserts infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, he faces two significant constraints in defining the range
of equivalents. First, a patentee is not allowed capture of matter that
could have been found in the prior art.5 The rationale for this limita-
tion is that the prior art limits what an inventor can claim, and a pat-
entee "should not be able to obtain [under the doctrine of equivalents]
... coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the
PTO by literal claims."6 A second constraint that limits the range of
equivalents potentially available to a patentee is embodied in the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. Under the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel, arguments and actions on the part of the
patent applicant may limit his right to assert that a competing product
is equivalent to the patented invention. Like the doctrine of equiva-
2. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'd 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded 65 U.S.L.W. 4162. (1997). See
infra note 99.
3. The finder of fact makes the determination of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
4 For example, defining exactly what is unimportant and insubstantial is one of the
most difficult assessments made in patent cases. The most commonly used method for deter-
mining the substantiality of the change is the function-way-result test of Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (an accused product that performs
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result" may
infringe a patent under the doctrine of equivalents). It has been argued, however, that this test
is ill-suited for certain classes of inventions. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29
F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Lourie, J., concurring) (the function-way-result test is inadequate
for determining the substantiality of change when the patented material is a chemical, e.g., a
biologically active protein).
Note also the danger that unpredictable or unclear application of the doctrine of equiva-
lents will lead eventually to uncertainty over the authority of the claims. See Charles Greiner
& Co., Inc. v. Mari-Med, Mfg. Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Application of the
doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule, for if the public comes to be-
lieve (or fear) that the language of the patent claims can never be relied on, and that the doc-
trine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly avail-
able to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims, the claims will cease to serve their
intended purpose.").
5. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.
1990). Prior art is the information in the public domain prior to the date of invention which
acts as a bar to patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) & (b) (1988). Publications or patents
describing the invention, or use or sale of the invention before the date of the invention can, in
some cases, be prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) & (b) (1988).
6. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
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lents, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel serves as "an equi-
table tool for determining the permissible scope of patent claims."7
The subject of this article is a possible expansion of the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel. The next section provides back-
ground and explains that at least one panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has signaled that prosecution history estoppel
may result when a patent applicant amends a claim to overcome a
rejection for lack of enablement. Section HI suggests that two related
rationales for prosecution history estoppel can be found in the Fed-
eral Circuit decisions on the topic and argues that finding estoppel
when an amendment is made in response to an enablement rejection
is consistent with these rationales. Section IV contends that such es-
toppel is warranted in certain, but not all, cases in which a claim is
amended to overcome an enablement rejection, and provides a ra-
tionale for distinguishing amendments that should or should not re-
sult in estoppel.
I. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL8 AND ENABLEMENT
REJECTIONS
A. Estoppel and Non-art Rejections
Prosecution history estoppel "limits infringement by otherwise
equivalent structures by barring recapture by the patentee of scope
that was surrendered in order to obtain allowance of the claims." 9
Under this doctrine, a patentee is bound by representations made be-
7. Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 258 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
8. The term prosecution history estoppel is preferred by the Federal Circuit and is used
in this paper. The equivalent, older, term file wrapper estoppel was used in the past and is
found in many of the cases cited herein. See id. at 258.
9. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d. 1211, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1995). No
single characterization of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel seems to cover all cir-
cumstances in which the doctrine has been found to be applicable. The characterization by the
Pall court, for example, does not account for the fact that estoppel may also result from com-
ments made by the patentee following an indication by the examiner that the claims are allow-
able. See Hormone Research Found., Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d. 1558, 1564 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). See also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d
1165, 1173-1175 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (arguments made during prosecution of related applications
may estop); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.P.A., 714 F.2d 110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(instructions to foreign associates prosecuting corresponding applications may be evidence
relating to prosecution history estoppel); Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applicant's failure to file continuation applications addressed to the
same subject matter is evidence favoring a finding of estoppel), clarified on rehearing in part,
15 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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fore the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) during prosecution; 10
she may not, for example, argue during prosecution that a claim term
has one meaning and assert a conflicting meaning later in court.
Prosecution history estoppel may similarly prevent a patentee from
narrowing a claim to overcome an examiner's rejection, and subse-
quently asserting that the claim should be construed in a way that re-
pudiates the original amendment. When the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel is invoked by a court, it does not entirely preclude
the patentee from asserting the doctrine of equivalents and does not
necessarily prevent the patentee from regaining some part of the
original claim scope." Instead, a court will look at the circumstances
under which the estopping amendment or argument was made to de-
termine the breath of estoppel.
Distinct categories of prosecution history estoppel may be clas-
sified according to the events leading to estoppel. "Classical estop-
pel!1 2 occurs when an applicant amends a claim in order to differenti-
ate the claimed matter from prior art cited by the examiner.' 3 The
applicant is then estopped from later asserting that his claim encom-
passes the surrendered matter. If the surrender is a consequence, not
of an amendment, but of an argument or representation made by the
applicant to overcome an art rejection, 4 the estoppel is phrased
"estoppel by admission."' 5 The term "art-estoppel" can be used to
describe any estoppel (including classical estoppel and estoppel by
admission) in which the estoppel arises from an applicant's response
to an examiner's prior art rejection. In a case in which the amend-
10. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942). Prosecution
refers to the negotiations that take place between the patent applicant and the PTO regarding
the patentability of the claimed invention. Usually, the applicant will be required to amend her
proposed claims before a patent is issued.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. This term, and some others used to describe types of estoppel, are adopted from
Carole F. Barrett, The Applicability of the Doctrine of File Wrapper Estoppel to Prevent Re-
capture ofAbandoned Patent Claims, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 767 (1980).
13. Reference is made throughout this article to estoppel resulting from claim amend-
ments. It should be appreciated by the reader that a change in claim scope achieved by can-
celing claims, or by some combination of canceling claims, amending claims, and filing new
claims, will have the same practical and legal effect. See, e.g., 4 DONALD S. CHISUM,
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINOE.
MENT, § 18.05[2), at 18-158 (1996) and at text accompanying notes 4-5.2, and cases cited
therein.
14. Art rejection refers to a rejection based on prior art, e.g., a rejection for lack of nov-
elty under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), or (e), or for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Con-
versely, a non-art rejection refers to a rejection not citing prior art, e.g., for lack of utility un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 101 or lackofan enabling specification under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
15. See Barrett, supra note 12.
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ment or representation is made to overcome a rejection that is not
based on prior art, any resulting estoppel can be called "non-art es-
toppel."t 6
The historical trend has been to broaden the types of actions that
can result in the application of doctrine of prosecution history estop-
pel.17 Thus by 1980, in addition to recognizing classical estoppel, the
courts in many circuits also recognized estoppel by admission.' 8
However, relatively few courts at the time recognized non-art estop-
pel t9 and at the time of the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,20 prosecution history estoppel was expressly limited
in several circuits to cases in which the estopping amendments and
comments were related to prior art rejections.2'
The Federal Circuit has rejected this limitation. Instead, it is
apparent that the Federal Circuit accepts, at least in principle, the no-
tion of estoppel resulting from arguments and amendments made in
response to non-art rejections.22 There have been relatively few rul-
16. Id. at 772.
17. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 786.
18. Id. However, there was no uniformly accepted standard for estoppel by admission.
19. Id.
20. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) was created in 1982 to
provide greater uniformity in the administration of the patent laws. The court has exclusive
appellant jurisdiction for most patent cases, including appeals from U.S. District Courts and
from decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See S. Rep. No. 97-275
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-13; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1982).
21. See, e.g., Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F.2d 66, 75 (3rd Cii.
1972) ("[F]or 'file wrapper estoppel' to become operable, it is necessary, at the least, that a
claim have been narrowed to avoid the prior art."). Limitation of the doctrine by courts con-
tinues to occur notwithstanding contrary -controlling precedent. See, e.g., Johnstown Am.
Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1159, 1164-65 (W.D. Penn. 1994) ("Prosecution
history estoppel does not apply when claim language is amended for some reason other than to
avoid prior art.").
See also Barrett, supra note 12, at 780-786 (reviewing the split in the circuits regarding
the applicability of prosecution history estoppel to non-art amendments) and Pall Corp. v. Mi-
cron Separations, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Mass. 1992) (contrasting the view of the
Third Circuit that only amendments made to overcome prior art rejections estop the patentee
from invoking the doctrine of equivalents with the views of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits to the contrary).
22. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220, 1231 (Fed. Cir.
1995). 'When amendments and arguments are made to impart precision rather than to over-
come prior art, the "prosecution is not presumed to raise an estoppel, but is reviewed on its
facts, with the guidance of precedent [citing four cases]" (emphasis added). Pall is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
The Federal Circuit's acceptance of non-art estoppel by amendment has not always been
apparent. In its first case addressing prosecution history estoppel, the Federal Circuit charac-
terized the doctrine as applying "to claim amendments to overcome rejections based on prior
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ings by the Federal Circuit regarding non-art estoppel, however, and
the range of circumstances in which prosecution history estoppel can
result from arguments or amendments made to overcome a non-art
rejection remain undefined. This article explores the application of
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel when amendments are
submitted by a patent applicant to overcome a particular type of non-
art rejection: enablement rejections made under § 112 of the patent
laws. 5
Section 112 imposes several requirements on the patent appli-
cant, chiefly in the first and second paragraphs. The first paragraph
of § 112 sets forth the requirement for an enabling disclosure: in the
patent specification, the applicant must instruct how to make and
utilize the invention. 24 Full disclosure enables others to make the in-
vention once the patent grant has expired and, more importantly,
places information that competitors can use for further research and
invention into the public domain. The enablement requirement can
be viewed as a bargain: in exchange for full disclosure of an inven-
tion, the inventor is awarded a property right. Implicit in this bargain
is the notion that the inventor should receive a patent that covers no
more than what she has invented. When an inventor attempts to
claim more than she discloses (i.e., when the disclosure of the speci-
fication is not commensurate in scope with the subject matter encom-
passed by the claim) the claim is rejected as "not enabled."25
The second paragraph of § 112 requires that the claims describe
the invention with precision and definiteness.26 A claim that includes
art and to arguments submitted to obtain the patent." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). The most natural reading of this
characterization would seem to exclude, by omission, estoppel based on amendments made to
overcome non-art rejections. See also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (appearing, like Hughes, to omit estoppel
based on amendments made to overcome non-art rejections: "Amendment of a claim in light
of a prior art reference ... is not the sine qua non to establish prosecution history estoppel.
Unmistakable assertions ... in support of patentability" may also estop).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
24. Id. In addition, the first paragraph of§ 112 requires that the specification contain a
written description of the invention, and that inventor disclose the best mode known to him for
making or using the invention.
25. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970). To be enabling, "the specifi-
cation of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without undue experimentation." In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed.
Cir. 1993). When a genus is claimed, the specification must provide guidance that allows one
of skill to determine, without undue experimentation, which species encompassed by the genus
are those with the desired properties. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). The second paragraph also specifies that the claims must be
directed to the subject matter "which the applicant regards as his invention."
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language that is indefinite, in the sense that one of skill in the art
would not be able to discern the "metes and bounds" of the claimed
subject matter, is rejected under § 112, second paragraph.
B. The Pall Decision
The Federal Circuit recently stressed in dicta its endorsement of
non-art estoppel, specifically citing § 112.27 In Pall Corp. v. Micron
Separations Inc.,28 the defendant in an infringement suit argued that
the plaintiff-patentee should be estopped by the prosecution history
from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The
defendant asserted that statements made by the patent applicant to
overcome an enablement rejection under § 112, first paragraph,
formed the basis of the estoppel.29 In turn, the plaintiff argued that no
estoppel could be found because the allegedly estopping statements
had not been made to overcome a prior art rejection. The district
27. "Non-art estoppel" is defined supra Part II.A.
28. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
29. The facts of the case are somewhat complicated; those relevant to the estoppel issue
are briefly summarized here. Pall Corporation (Pall) held a patent for a nylon membrane made
from a polyamide resin and useful for microfiltration. Pall had originally submitted a parent
patent application containing broad claims which specified no upper or lower limit on the
methylene: amide ratio of the polyamide resin. As a result of additional research, however,
Pall decided that its original view of usable nylon resins was too broad. Pall discovered, for
example, that resins with methylene: amide ratios of 3:1, in the lower range, or 8:1, in the up-
per range, did not work. Based on this new information, Pall filed the continuation-in-part
application (CIP) that ultimately matured into the allegedly infringed patent. The CIP claimed
resins having methylene: amide ratios "within the range of about 5:1 to about 7:1." The lower
limit of 5:1 represented the lowest ratio resin, of those tested by Pall, that was operative. The
examiner rejected the new, narrowed, claims under § 112 as too broad and not supported by
the disclosure. In traversing the rejection, Pall argued that the claimed range was "rather nar-
row" and excluded the "vast majority of polyamide resins."
Micron Separations, Inc., (Micron) was accused of infringing Pall's patent by marketing a
membrane made from a resin with a methylene: amide ratio of 4:1, below the range recited in
Pall's claims but above the range tested (and found inoperative) by Pall. Both the District
Court and the Federal Circuit found that the 4:1 membrane did not literally infringe the mem-
brane claimed by Pall. It was Micron's position that Pall was estopped from establishing in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents because Pall "voluntarily gave up claim scope
that would have literally included [Micron's membrane]" during prosecution of the patent.
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d at 1217-18. Pall, in turn, argued that no estop-
pel should be found because no claim scope was required to be yielded due to prior art or
based on any requirement of patent examination. Both the district court and the Federal Cir-
cuit held that (1) estoppel was not limited to art rejections, but (2) there was no estoppel in this
case. The district court noted that Pall was under no obligation to experiment with "every pos-
sible methylene to amide combination in order to claim the patented invention." Pall Corp. v.
Micron Separations, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1298, 1327 (D. Mass. 1992). Both courts found that
Micron had infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
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court held that no estoppel existed.30 In affirming the district court's
decision, the Federal Circuit was clear in rejecting the assumption
that prosecution history estoppel is limited to amendments made to
overcome prior art rejections. The court explained that "[w]hether
amendment or argument made in response to a rejection under Sec-
tion 112 produces an estoppel, as does an amendment made to obtain
allowance in view of cited references, is dependent on the particular
facts." 31
Both the context of the Pall court's reference to "Section 1 12"32
and the facts of the case33 indicate that the court's reference to § 112
is meant to include the first paragraph of the section, requiring an
enabling disclosure. This is notable because the few Federal Circuit
decisions antedating Pall that discuss § 112 and prosecution history
estoppel refer to the second paragraph of the section, requiring deft-
niteness, 34 rather than the first paragraph. The Pall court's dicta sug-
30. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1298, 1327-28 (D. Mass. 1992).
31. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
32. The context of the sentence cited is as follows:
The estoppel asserted by [Micron] arose not from prior art but from Pall's
statement to the examiner, in response to the rejection that the claims were too
broad and unsupported by the disclosure, that the claims were "actually rather
narrow." There were no changes made in the claims in response to this rejec-
tion. A rejection for lack of support in the specification is deemed a rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph [citation omitted] .... Section 112, first
paragraph, states in part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, to make and use the same...
Whether amendment or argument made in response to a rejection under § 112
produces an estoppel, as does an amendment made to obtain allowance in view
of cited references, is dependent on the particular facts.
Id.
33. The allegedly estopping remark was made in response to a rejection for nonenable-
ment under § 112, first paragraph.
34. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.P.A., 714 F.2d 110 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The Federal Circuit has never reported finding estoppel based in a response to a section
112 rejection. This has lead some commentators and lower courts to incorrectly conclude that
prosecution history estoppel exists only when claims are amended to avoid prior art. See, e.g.,
Johnstown Am. Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
The Federal Circuit has encountered estoppel and enablement in at least one case other
than Pall. In Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip Leasing, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Or. 1987),
vacated in part, on reconsideration, 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the Federal Circuit re-
versed a district court judge's action overturning ajury verdict. The patent at issue related to a
method for processing lumber using a computer-controlled apparatus. The claims were re-
jected by the PTO under § 112, first paragraph, because the examiner asserted that there was an
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gests the possibility of an extension of the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel in which arguments and amendments made to over-
come rejections for lack of enablement could result in estoppel.
The Federal Circuit's refusal to rule out the possibility of estop-
pel based on amendments made to overcome an enablement rejection
does not, of course, constitute endorsement of such an extension of
estoppel. The remainder of this article considers whether
"enablement estoppel" 35 is consistent with the purposes of the doc-
trine of prosecution history estoppel as articulated by the Federal Cir-
cuit.36
C. Estoppel and Enablement Rejections
Before considering the policy bases of prosecution history es-
toppel, it will be useful to sketch out a situation in which estoppel
based on a response to an enablement rejection might arise. The fol-
lowing hypothetical example37 illustrates the concept of enablement
inadequate disclosure of how the computer performs its functions. The examiner withdrew the
rejection after the applicant argued that "the computation was routine to one skilled in the art,
and that it was necessary only to follow the specification." Id. at 990. Thus, although in this
case there was a rejection for nonenablement, there was, as in Pall, no amendment of the
claims made in response. Notwithstanding the absence of any change in position by the appli-
cant, the district court judge, on a theory of prosecution history estoppel, reversed a jury find-
ing for the plaintiff and granted a judgment n.o.v. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that it
did "not discern a basis for estoppel in these events." Id. The court did not specify the reason
it found no estoppel.
35. The term "enablement estoppel" is used by analogy to terms such as "art estoppel,"
supra text accompanying note 13, to refer to prosecution history estoppel arising from amend-
ments made to overcome enablement rejections.
36. The discussion that follows is concerned exclusively with the potential estopping
effect of amendments made to overcome an enablement rejection and does not concern the
potential estopping effect of arguments made to overcome rejections under § 112, first para-
graph. It is not difficult to imagine how an argument made in response to an enablement re-
jection might be estopping. For example, an examiner might reject a claim to a method for
extracting fibers from a "plant" on the grounds that the specification does not enable extraction
from fungi (which, in some historical classification systems, are considered members of the
plant kingdom). If the applicant concedes that extraction from fungi is not enabled, but over-
comes the rejection by arguing that fungi are not considered plants by those of skill, she might
then be estopped from asserting that the doctrine of equivalents should allow the claim to en-
compass extraction from fungi. Provided with an appropriate fact pattern, there does not seem
to be any policy, theoretical, or precedential barrier to finding estoppel based on arguments
made to overcome rejections under § 112, first paragraph.
37. The facts are loosely based on those of CoulterElecs., Inc. v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co.,
487 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The Coulter court held that the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel did not apply to amendments made to overcome rejections not based on prior
art, and adopted an "intent to abandon" test for estoppel. Id. at 1174-75. The court also stated
that the claim element at issue (metallic phosphates) "had nothing to do with the patentability
of the invention." Id. at 1175.
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estoppel. Consider a patent application for a novel blood diluent,3 8 in
which the applicant's originally filed claim is to a composition com-
prising "1% sucrose in an osmotically balanced solution of metallic
phosphates." The examiner rejects the claim under § 112, first para-
graph, as "broader than the enabling disclosure in the recitation of the
enormously broad term 'metallic phosphates."' In response, the ap-
plicant amends the claim, replacing the generic term, metallic phos-
phates, with "sodium phosphate," a specific metallic phosphate for
which the specification provides ample support. Consequently, the
patent issues. When a competitor later markets a blood diluent iden-
tical to the plaintiffs except for the use of potassium phosphate in
place of sodium phosphate, the applicant (now patentee) sues, as-
serting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In defense,
the competitor asserts that, by narrowing the original amendment in
order to secure allowance of the claim, the plaintiff has surrendered
compositions containing metallic phosphates other than sodium
phosphate and is now estopped from claiming them.
Should the plaintiff above be estopped from regaining claim
scope that was surrendered in order to obtain patent allowance? On
the facts presented here most patent attorneys would find such a re-
sult to be profoundly unfair, particularly because sodium phosphate
and potassium phosphate are known by chemists to be interchange-
able in many applications.3 9 On different facts in which the alleged
equivalent has been more specifically rejected and surrendered, how-
ever, estoppel based on an amendment to overcome an enablement
rejection might seem to lead to the correct result. For example,
imagine that the examiner had rejected "metallic phosphates" as
overbroad because only one of two classes of metallic phosphates
was enabled: the specification teaches how to make and use "alkali-
metal phosphates" (one class of metallic phosphates) but not
"alkaline-earth metal phosphates" (a second class of metallic phos-
phates). 40 The claim might then be amended to recite "1% sucrose in
an osmotically balanced solution of alkali-metal phosphates." If,
38. A diluent is a diluting agent, in this case used for dilution of blood in order that indi-
vidual blood cells can be counted.
39. Known interchangeability at the time of infringement of the element that differs be-
tween the claimed invention and the accused product is evidence of an insubstantial change,
suggesting equivalence. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Waner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62
F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
40. The "alkali-metals" are elements of group Ia of the periodic table, including lithium,
sodium, potassium, cesium, and others. The "alkaline-earth metals" are found in group Ila of
the periodic table and include calcium, beryllium, magnesium, barium and others. See 15 THE
NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrmANNICA, CHEMICAL ELEMENTS 931 (1990).
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through independent research, a competing manufacturer develops a
similar blood diluent containing barium phosphate, an alkaline-earth
metal phosphate whose interchangeability with alkali-metal phos-
phates was not generally appreciated, it might appear reasonable to
estop the patent holder from obtaining rights, under the doctrine of
equivalents, to a composition that he has neither claimed nor en-
abled.41 In a case in which the equivalence (of a claimed and accused
invention) could not have been foreseen at the time the patent is-
sued42 or was filed, an applicant's removal of specific subject matter
from the literal scope of the claims might be seen as a signal to a
competitor that, should the competitor go to the expense of identify-
ing a previously unknown similar embodiment, he would not be sub-
ject to suit for infringement.
The Federal Circuit, having rejected the notion that prosecution
history estoppel is limited to arguments and amendments made in re-
sponse to art rejections, has not yet made clear whether- or
when -amendments made to overcome enablement rejections will
result in estoppel. It is possible to construct a set of facts, as in the
hypothetical above, in which enablement estoppel seems to lead to a
reasonable outcome. The next section considers whether enablement
estoppel is consistent with the policy bases the Federal Circuit has set
forth for prosecution history estoppel.
III. THE POLICY BASIS OF PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
Although the Federal Circuit has accepted non-art estoppel in
principle, the outer bounds of the court's vision of prosecution his-
tory estoppel remain unclear. One way to approach the issue of ex-
panding the doctrine to include enablement estoppel is to ask whether
enablement estoppel conforms to the policy basis of prosecution his-
tory estoppel as it is now applied. Unfortunately, no single underly-
ing rationale for prosecution history estoppel has been authoritatively
stated, although a variety of rationales for prosecution history estop-
41. See also Laura A. Handley, Refining the Graver Tank Analysis with Hypothetical
Claims: A Biotechnology Exemplar, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 31 (1991). In her well reasoned
article, Handley suggests that the enablement requirement of § 112 should be incorporated into
doctrine of equivalents analysis in a way analogous to the present incorporation, illustrated by
Wilson Sporting Goods, of the novelty requirement. Under Handley's proposal, a finding that
an allegedly infringing product is an equivalent of the claimed invention would be possible
only when the patent specification enables the new product.
42. The Hilton Davis majority rejected the position found in Judge Nies' dissent that the
range of infringing substitutions is limited to those which were known to be equivalents at the
time the patent issued. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1528 and 1562. Accord, Atlas Powder Co. v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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pel has been suggested by commentators and courts.43 The decisions
of the Federal Circuit suggest that the court has adopted two overlap-
ping rationales for prosecution history estoppel. The first emphasizes
the notice function of the prosecution history, and the second stresses
the importance of the process of patent examination.
A. Notice
According to the notice rationale, a patentee's competitors are
entitled to rely on the prosecution history of an issued patent4 to in-
terpret the claims and estimate the range of claim equivalents,
thereby avoiding liability for infringement. The Federal Circuit en-
dorsed notice as a basis for prosecution history estoppel, holding, for
example, that a patentee who attempted to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents was "estopped from... broadening the description of a
claim element limited during prosecution so as to encompass a
structure which a competitor should reasonably be entitled to believe
is not within the legal boundaries of the patent claims in suit."45
The requirement that the patentee be bound by the prosecution
43. See generally CHISUM, supra note 13, § 18.05[1] (discussing the nature of the estop-
pel). See also Kevin R. Casey, Judge Learned Hand Guides the Federal Circuit: A Model for
a Uniform Doctrine of Prosecution History Estoppel, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1985)
(prosecution history estoppel should be based on contract principles).
44. The prosecution history becomes a public document after the patent is issued. 37
C.F.R. § 1.11(a)(1995).
45. Prodyne Enters., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added). See also Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (standard for determining what subject matter is relinquished is "measured
from the vantage point of what a competitor was reasonably entitled to conclude, from the
prosecution history, that the applicant gave up to procure issuance of the patent"); Haynes
Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (following Prodyne); Hoga-
nas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding estoppel based on
what "a reasonable competitor was entitled to conclude"); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741
F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The file on [appellant's] patent, to which the public had ac-
cess, explicitly showed that in response to the examiner's rejection, [appellant] narrowed his
claims ... [appellant has offered] no convincing reason why a competing manufacturer was
not justified in assuming that if he built a planter in which the radius of the wheels was greater
than that of the disc, he would not infringe the... patent.").
Cf. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (in reference to
claim construction, "Other players in the marketplace are entitled to rely on the record made in
the Patent Office in determining the meaning and scope of the patent"); Mentor Corp. v.
Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing notice in the context of a
broadening reissue patent, "[i]t is precisely because the patentee amended his claims to over-
come prior art that a member of the public is entitled to occupy the space abandoned by the
patent applicant. Thus, the reissue statute cannot be construed in such a way that competitors,
properly relying on prosecution history, become patent infringers when they do so. In this
case, Mentor narrowed its claims for the purpose of obtaining allowance in the original prose-
cution and it is now precluded from recapturing what it earlier conceded.") (emphasis added).
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history does not serve merely to protect specific competitors from
being misled. Such a limited purpose suggests that prosecution his-
tory estoppel requires detrimental reliance on the part of the defen-
dant, a requirement not supported in the case law.46 Instead, the
prosecution history, along with the specification and claims, provides
notice about patent scope to the entire community of competitors. As
commentators have noted in recent years, there is a complex relation-
ship between claim scope awarded and the ability of the patent sys-
tem to encourage invention and innovation, especially in "science-
based" arts such as biotechnology.47 Claim scope that does not rea-
sonably correlate with the inventor's contribution can result in de-
creased technological development. This may occur when workers
who advance the art by improving on and designing around patented
inventions decline to do so because they fear repercussions for in-
fringing the patented invention. 4
The "claim scope" that affects a competitor's decision about
whether to market a product similar to the patented device, or to con-
duct research aimed at creating an improvement of a patented inven-
tion, is not only a function of the scope of the court's interpretation.49
Claim scope also encompasses what is understood or estimated by
competitors before litigation arises. In attempting to estimate the
reach of a patent, a competitor will refer, just as a court will, to the
prosecution history. 0 The anticipated legal effect of the prosecution
46. See Casey, supra note 43, at 393-94 (asserting that defendants in patent cases seldom
prove that they suffered injury by relying on the prosecution history). See also CHISUM, supra
note 13, § 18.05[1] (distinction between prosecution history estoppel and estoppel as used in
other legal contexts is that only the latter requires actual detrimental reliance by the person
seeking to establish the estoppel); Kurt James, Patent Claims and Prosecution History Estop-
pel in the Federal Circuit, 53 Mo. L. REv. 497, 514 (1988) (reliance by defendants in patent
case is unlikely).
47. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990); Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology
Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777 (1992); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. wamer-Jenkinson
Co., Inc., 62 F.3d at 1512, 1512-36 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
48. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1529-1536 (Newman, J., concurring).
49. I refer here to both the court's determination of the literal scope of the claims and the
scope under the doctrine of equivalents.
50. One might question whether the prosecution history is, in fact, studied by competi-
tors as part of a process of making business decisions, or whether the notice theory assumes
unrealistic behavior on the part of competitors. Joseph E. Dvorak, in afn often-quoted article,
argued that "[ilt is particularly difficult to picture the large number of alleged infringers sifting
through the patent office files and being mislead by applicants' statements contained in those
records." Joseph E. Dvorak, That Perplexing Problem - the Doctrine of File Wrapper Estop-
pel, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 143, 144 (1968). However, at least in the context of arts in which
the parties are sophisticated in patent matters and the expenditures are large (e.g., the biotech-
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history will thus influence decisions about whether to develop, or
enter the market with, a competing product.
Consistent with its reliance on the notice rationale, the Federal
Circuit will find estoppel where the surrender of claim scope would
be readily apparent to a competitor, but is more cautious when the
fact or scope of a surrender is unclear. Thus, "unmistakable asser-
tions" regarding claim language are sufficient to estop 5' while claim
amendments that would not be understood by a reasonable competi-
tor as surrendering claim scope will not necessarily result in estop-
pel.52 Similarly, the addition of clarifying language intended merely
to better define an invention will not necessarily estop.53 Note that in
determining whether a reasonable competitor could infer that the ap-
plicant has made a surrender of claim scope, it is the apparent inten-
tion of the applicant to surrender scope, as revealed in the prosecu-
tion history, that is relevant, rather than any actual subjective
intention of the applicant at the time the amendment was made.54
To be sure, when the estopping effect of an amendment is dis-
puted the court does not necessarily frame its discussion in terms of
notice. One list of what the court will consider in assessing the es-
topping effect of an amendment includes: the content of any prior art
documents cited by the examiner, comments about the amendment
made by the applicant, and the role of the amendment in inducing the
examiner to allow the claims. 55 Each of these factors allows the court
to identify claim amendments that would be understood by competi-
tors as an indication that an intentional surrender of claim scope has
nological and pharmaceutical arts), it is probably not unrealistic to expect that a party will ex-
amine the prosecution history before major investments are made, at least when a plain reading
of the patent claims reveals the possibility of a conflict.
51. Such assertions estop even when the assertions were not required for claim allow-
ance. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 1995 WL 253177 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (unpublished).
52. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 72 F.3d 857,
864 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding no reversible error in trial court's holding of no estoppel and ob-
serving that "[t]he reason for the addition was not stated in the prosecution history, was vigor-
ously disputed at trial, and was not at all clear to the trial judge, who called the addition 'a
mystery").
53. Hi-Life Prods., Inc. v. American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Interestingly, in both H-Life
and Moeller, the allegedly estopping action was the applicant's acquiescence to an examiner's
amendment.
54. For example, evidence that is not a part of the prosecution history (e.g., notes from
an internal business meeting) indicating that the applicant intended not to narrow a claim
would not be considered in determining estoppel.
55. Festo, 72 F.3d at 864.
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been made. The content of the prior art provides evidence indicative
of the applicant's motivation to surrender scope; comments by the
applicant provide direct evidence regarding an intention to surrender
scope; and the examiner's understanding of the import of the
amendment is indicative of what a reasonable competitor's under-
standing would be.56
Amendments made to claims in response to enablement rejec-
tions will often provide notice of a surrender of claim scope that is
equal in clarity to the notice provided by amendments made to over-
come art rejections. Imagine, for example, that a novel device for
sensing light is invented. A broad claim to the invention might re-
cite, inter alia, "a sensor activated by light." If the examiner cites
prior art that renders a sensor activated by ultraviolet light obvious,
the claim might subsequently be limited to recite "a sensor activated
by visible light." In this case, a competitor would be on notice that
the claim does not read on an ultraviolet-activated sensor, and the
patentee would be estopped from asserting in court that an apparatus
activated by ultraviolet light is an equivalent to one activated by visi-
ble light.
The same notice regarding claim scope would be provided to the
competitor if the claim amendment had been motivated, not by an
obviousness rejection, but by an examiner's assertion that a sensor
activated by ultraviolet light was not enabled by the specification. If
the claim is allowed and a patent issued, a competitor might reasona-
bly conclude that ultraviolet activation is not encompassed by the
claim, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Using the
notice provided by an applicant's action as the criterion for finding
estoppel, there is no basis for excluding per se amendments respon-
sive to enablement rejections from the set of potentially estopping
actions.57
56. Consideration of the final element of the Festo list, the role of the amendment in in-
ducing the examiner to allow claims, is illustrated in several cases. See also Gussin v. Nin-
tendo of Am., Inc., 62 F.3d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (finding estoppel in light of
fact that applicant's arguments provided the motivation for examiner's allowance of claims);
Great Northern Corp., v. Davis Core & Pad Co., Inc., 782 F.2d 159, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding of no estoppel motivated, in part, by determination that the examiner's rejection was
improper); Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(no estoppel where examiner did not depend on applicant's statements in allowing patent to
issue); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding no estop-
pel and noting that in light of the facts, a reasonable competitor "would not be justified in con-
cluding the examiner relied on this distinction [between the claimed invention and the prior art
device] in allowing the claims .... ).
57. Other commentators have also concluded, generally with little discussion, that en-
ablement estoppel is appropriate. Carole E. Barrett, supra note 12, would limit both art and
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The degree to which a prosecution history provides a competitor
with "notice" depends, of course, on the competitor's ability to inter-
pret the prosecution history with confidence and anticipate its effect
in court. There is an obvious element of circularity in assessing the
notice-giving effect of arguments and amendments in a prosecution
history: if the courts signal that certain actions or statements (e.g.,
those having to do with enablement) do not have an estopping effect,
competitors will interpret the prosecution history accordingly. Ab-
sent, however, signals from the court that in a given situation estop-
pel exists per se (or does not exist), the notice rationale depends on
the reasonable inferences a competitor can make at the time of in-
fringement. Because the estopping effect of an amendment is not ab-
solute, but can vary along a continuum in a fact-dependent manner, 8
Section IV of this paper argues that estoppel is warranted only when
the extent, as well as the presence, of the surrender can be determined
by the competitor.
non-art estoppel to cases in which the amendment encompasses changes "essential to the scope
of the invention." Barrett argues that where "changes in terms essential to the invention's
scope are ... necessitated by overclaiming, application of file wrapper estoppel would seem
appropriate .... Indeed, if an applicant agrees to a narrow construction of an essential term to
overcome a non-art rejection, equitable application of the doctrine... demands that he be pre-
cluded from circumventing the patent procedure by resurrecting the exact matter denied him
by the Patent Office." Id. at 784-85.
Chisum, supra note 13, §18.05[2], writes that "[t]he rationale of file wrapper estoppel
would seem to apply equally to non-art rejections directed to the breadth of claims - such as
lack of enabling support in the specification." Chisum's rationale for prosecution history es-
toppel is discussed infra at note 71.
Laura A. Handley, supra note 41, proposes incorporating the enablement requirement into
the doctrine of equivalents analysis. In her article, Handley assumes, without exploring the
issue, that an inventor who narrows claims in response to an enablement rejection "may be
precluded by prosecution history estoppel from later claiming that his specification enabled
[another species of the genus to which the claimed invention belongs]." Id. at 56.
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has found estoppel where a claim was narrowed in re-
sponse to a rejection for lack of enablement. H.M. Chase Corp. v. Idaho Potato Processors,
Inc., 529 P.2d 1270 (Idaho 1974). The suit concerned whether a process for producing "tater
tots" (frozen potato pieces) using a hot-water blanch was the subject of a patent owned by the
plaintiff and licensed to the defendant. The primary issue was whether a hot-water blanch was
an equivalent of a claimed steam blanch. During the original prosecution, the applicant was
prevented from amending a claim that described a steam blanch to include a hot-water blanch,
on the grounds that the hot-water blanch constituted new matter. In reissue proceedings, the
applicant filed a claim for a process that included the step of exposing potato pieces "to suffi-
cient heat to inactivate enzymes." Id. at 1279. This claim was rejected by the PTO as over-
broad because it failed to limit the claim to the use of steam, the heating method described in
the specification. The applicant subsequently submitted a new claim limited to steam
blanches. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the patent holder was estopped, in acqui-
escing to these rejections and failing to appeal, from claiming that steam and hot-water
blanches were equivalents. Id. at 1282.
58. See discussion infra Part IV.
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B. Insuring Adequate Examination
Although notice to competitors is the rationale most clearly ar-
ticulated by the Federal Circuit, it is not the only basis for prosecu-
tion history estoppel. A second rationale is rooted in the process by
which patents are obtained: examination of an application before the
Patent and Trademark Office. In making a determination as to pat-
entability, the PTO acts to guarantee both that the claims are limited
to patentable subject matter 9 and that the scope of protection is
clearly defined60 and commensurate with the inventor's contribution
to the art.6' An applicant faced with rejected claims has choices
about how to proceed. She may limit the claims by amendment (or
cancellation) or, alternatively, avail herself of the opportunity to
overcome the rejection by appealing to the Board of Patent Appeals
Interferences 62 and subsequently to Federal District Court63 and/or the
Federal Circuit.64
An applicant who, rather than appealing, acquiesces to the ex-
aminer's judgment by amending a claim has removed subject matter
from the examination before the PTO. Courts have frequently em-
phasized the requirement for a reasonable correspondence between
subject matter placed before the PTO and the scope later upheld in
court:65 prosecution history estoppel serves to insure that the claim
scope awarded a patentee in court does not include matter removed
from examination, but, rather, corresponds to what was presented for
examination before the PTO.
59. The claimed invention must fall into a statutorily patentable category and be novel,
useful, and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982).
60. The second paragraph of§ 112 requires that the claims particularly point out and
distinctly claim subject matter of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
61. The invention must be novel and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
Moreover, a patent will be awarded only for those claims that are enabled by the specification.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Claims not meeting these requirements are rejected as unpatentable.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (1995).
63. An applicant can contest the denial of a patent by bringing a civil action against the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1984).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1982); 37 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1995).
65. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. CI. 1967)
("When the application is rejected, the applicant will insert limitations and restrictions for the
purpose of inducing the Patent Office to grant his patent. When the patent is issued, the pat-
entee cannot disclaim these alterations and seek ... broadly before the-courts."). Cf. Judge
Hand's observation that "[1]f the rejection [by the examiner] is wrong, the applicant has reme-
dies both in the Patent Office and the courts: remedies which the cancellation of the rejected
claim necessarily surrenders." Musher Found. v. Alba Trading Co., 150 F.2d 885, 888 (2d Cir.
1945).
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In Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd.,66 the Federal
Circuit noted that the requirement that claim scope comport with the
results of a full examination applies equally whether the alleged in-
fringement is literal or by equivalents. The claims at issue in
Genentech were directed to a "human tissue plasminogen activator,"
which the court found necessary to define as a first step to determin-
ing infringement. The court discerned four different possible defini-
tions in the patent specification and declared that, in deciding among
them, it should avoid "those definitions upon which the PTO could
not reasonably have relied when it issued the patent. '67 The court
went on to declare that an applicant should not be permitted to submit
ambiguously worded claims to the PTO in the hope that they will be
construed narrowly during prosecution, and then argue after allow-
ance that they should be construed more broadly.6 In making this
point, the court made no distinction between literal claim scope and
scope obtained under the doctrine of equivalents, stating:
An applicant should not be able deliberately to narrow the scope of
examination to avoid during prosecution scrutiny by the PTO of
subject matter with the objective of more quickly obtaining a pat-
ent (or avoiding the risk of an estoppel), and then obtain in court,
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, a scope of
protection which encompasses that subject matter.69
If there was no prohibition on narrowing claims during exami-
nation and subsequently "expanding" them (either by expansive
claim construction or under the doctrine of equivalents) during liti-
gation, the result would be a disparity between the actual claim scope
awarded by the PTO following examination and the effective claim
scope from which the patentee could benefit. Such disparity would
reduce efforts to design around or improve patented inventions.
Competitors would be reluctant to develop similar products or im-
66. 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
67. Id. at 1564.
68. Id.
69. Id. In a footnote later in the decision, the court reiterated this point and connected it
to the issue of notice. The court wrote:
Another problem faced by plaintiffs/appellees is that the doctrine of equivalents
is not available for the attainment in court of a scope of protection which en-
compasses subject matter deliberately removed from examination during prose-
cution through narrow claiming. This is a reflection of the rule enunciated in
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., that it is impermissible to
erase under the doctrine of equivalents "meaningful' limitations of the claim on
which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement."
Id. at 1568 n.41 (citations omitted).
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prove on existing patented inventions if they believed that the scope
of the existing patent claims might be enlarged to encompass the re-
sult of their own efforts.
In Genentech, the scope of the examination was narrow, not be-
cause broad claims were narrowed by amendment during prosecu-
tion, but because narrowly (or ambiguously) worded claims were
submitted to the PTO. However, the rule that an applicant is not en-
titled to claim scope encompassing matter that, through intentional
actions on the part of the applicant, has not been examined and al-
lowed by the PTO does not depend on the point in prosecution at
which the claims are narrowed.70 Narrow drafting of the original
claims and subsequent narrowing by amendment both remove matter
from examination and ultimate resolution. Moreover, when the nar-
row scope is due to amendment, there is no difference between
amendments responsive to art-rejections and those responsive to en-
ablement-rejections: a limitation added to overcome an enablement
rejection removes subject matter from the examination process as ef-
fectively as an amendment added to overcome a prior art rejection.
Just as for notice, under the "adequate examination" rationale, there
is no basis for excluding enablement amendments from the catalogue
of potentially estopping actions.
Under the "adequate examination" rationale, the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel should apply only to subject matter that
has been removed from examination by the applicant. This raises the
issue of how to determine exactly what that subject matter includes.
Professor Chisum's view is that the effect of estoppel should only be
commensurate in scope with the construction of the claim as mutu-
ally understood by the examiner and the applicant, as revealed by the
prosecution history.71 A better measure of what has or has not been
removed from examination would be the understanding that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have in light of the prosecution history.
Statute and case law regarding novelty,72 obviousness 73 and enable-
70. A different case arises when matter has not been examined, not because it was ex-
cluded from examination by the applicant, but because of post-filing developments in the art.
See infra note 90.
71. CHMUSsM, supra note 13, § 18.05[1]. Professor Chisum has argued that the best ra-
tionale for prosecution history estoppel is based on the circumvention of the "administrative
procedures and expertise of the [Patent & Trademark] Office" that occurs when an applicant
adopts a narrow definition before the PTO and relies upon a broader definition in an infringe-
ment suit. Id.
72. Invalidity for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102 requires that there be "no difference
between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary
skill in the field of the invention." Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927
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ment74 require that the examiner (and the courts) use the perspective
of a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in determining patentability,
and consistency requires that this perspective, rather than those views
that the applicant and examiner happen to share, should govern es-
toppel as well.75 Thus, under the "adequate examination" rationale,
an applicant should be estopped from reaching equivalents that one
of skill would understand, based on the prosecution history, to have
been removed by the applicant from examination. According to this
rational, the removal of subject matter from examination to avoid an
enablement rejection has the same effect on the scope of examination
as removal to avoid an art rejection, and should logically have the
same effect in relation to prosecution history estoppel.
Although they are formulated differently, the "adequate exami-
nation" rationale and the "notice" rationale are related, As recog-
nized by the Federal Circuit, a "reasonable competitor's" interpreta-
tion of the prosecution history is based on the reading that would be
made by one of ordinary skill in the art.76 The actions that provide a
competitor with notice that the scope of a claim does not extend to
certain subject matter also inform a person of ordinary skill that the
subject matter has been withdrawn from examination.77 In short, un-
der either the "adequate examination" or "notice" rationales, a find-
ing of prosecution history estoppel will be based on the interpretation
by one of skill in the art as to what was presented for, and removed
from, examination. Moreover, either rational can be applied to
amendments made to overcome an enablement rejection as well as to
F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
73. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp.1996). The statute requires that, to be patentable,
an invention must not have been obvious to "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
the subject matter [of the invention] pertains."
74. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). The statute requires that the specification "enable any per-
son skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the [claimed invention]."
75. As a practical matter it would be expected that the mutually held construction of the
examiner and applicant would be strong evidence of what one of skill would believe. This
reasoning is in accord with dicta in Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952 n.15
(Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Ordinarily, the test for determining the meaning of a claim term is from the
vantage point of one skilled in the art. This test would seem equally appropriate for determin-
ing what subject matter was relinquished in the context of prosecution history estoppel'). See
also Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (standard for determining whether particular subject matter was relinquished "is based
on the reasonable reading, by a person of skill in the field of the invention, of the entire prose-
cution history").
76. Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (vantage
point for determining what subject matter was relinquished is that of one reasonably skilled in
the art viewing the question from the perspective of a competitor in the marketplace).
77. See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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amendments made to overcome art-based rejections.
IV. THE EXTENT OF ESTOPPEL
The Federal Circuit has emphasized that the existence of an es-
topping amendment or argument does not preclude a patent holder
from invoking the doctrine of equivalents. The fact that claims are
narrowed during prosecution does not necessarily prevent a patentee
from "recapturing some of what was originally claimed. '78 Instead,
"a close examination [of the prosecution history] must be made as to,
not only what was surrendered, but also the reasons for such a sur-
render." 79 Deciding what part, if any, of the surrendered claim scope
can be recaptured as an equivalent -that is, the "extent" of the es-
toppel -is as critical as whether an amendment has any estopping
effect at all. The extent of estoppel, as well as its existence, depends
heavily on the facts and circumstances of the specific case at issue.
78. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871, (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft v. Dupar Int'l Research, 738 F.2d 1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
79. Loctite Corp., 781 F.2d at 871. The view of the Federal Circuit in this regard has not
always been clear. Kurt James, supra note 46, has argued that two distinct lines of cases can
be distinguished in Federal Circuit decisions. According to his analysis, a "broad application"
of prosecution history estoppel is found in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir.
1984), and cases following it, and a "narrow application" is found in Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and its progeny. In the "broad application"
cases, the court, upon finding that estopping acts or amendments are present, declines to in-
vestigate the circumstances of the amendment in order to determine the scope of estoppel. In
"narrow application" the court is more fact sensitive, and will look to the prior art, prosecution
history, and other facts in order to determine the extent of the estoppel (i.e., whether any of the
surrendered matter might be "recaptured").
The conflict identified by Mr. James has been resolved in favor of the "broad" Hughes
standard. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (when prosecution history estoppel is invoked examination must be made of the
reason for the surrender). In this light, the Kinzenbaw has a more limited interpretation, signi-
fying that when the primary distinction between the claimed invention and the asserted
equivalent is subject matter that was clearly surrendered, the range of equivalents will be very
narrow. See infra note 89 and corresponding text. See also Texas Instruments Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that a determination
of estoppel requires examination of the prosecution history and citing Kinzenbaw for the
proposition that "unmistakable assertions" may result in estoppel).
For an argument that the "narrow/broad" dispute remains unresolved, see Paul J. Ot-
terstedt, Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A New Economic Policy
Approach, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 405 (1993). Otterstedt argues that the "Kinzenbaw" ap-
proach has not been abandoned. As examples of recent cases using a "broad application" Ot-
terstedt cites Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992), which is more
properly viewed as a claim construction case, and Charles Greiner & Co., Inc., v. Mari-Med
Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Charles Greiner, the issue of estoppel appears
to have been irrelevant: the accused device was substantially changed compared to the claimed
invention. Accordingly, even without considering the prosecution history, no infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents could have been found.
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The extent of estoppel found by the Federal Circuit in a particu-
lar case is often an instrument for reaching an equitable result rather
than the result of application of a clear rule,80 and the criteria used by
the court to determine the effect of an estopping amendment have not
been set forth in any clear or systematic way. The Federal Circuit's
well-known observation that "[d]epending on the nature and purpose
of an amendment, it may have a limiting effect from great to small to
zero," 8' for example, tells little about what the relationship is between
the "nature and purpose" of an amendment and its limiting effect.
The guidance that can be found in the case law regarding the
determination of the extent of estoppel is limited almost exclusively
to cases in which the applicant has responded to an art rejection. In
cases of art estoppel, reference to the prior art cited by the examiner
is useful in determining the scope of estoppel.82 Although the estop-
ping effect of an amendment is not limited to exactly what was re-
quired to distinguish the prior art,83 the prior art documents cited by
an examiner making an art rejection serve as important extrinsic evi-
dence that an intentional surrender of claim scope has been made and
provide clues as to the extent of the surrender. 84 No evidence exactly
analogous to the prior art is available for enablement rejections.
In considering enablement estoppel we should expect the basis
of determinations regarding the extent of estoppel to be related to the
rationales that have been adopted by the Federal Circuit for finding
estoppel generally: the provision of notice to competitors and the re-
quirement that an applicant not recapture matter intentionally re-
80. Justice Newman, speaking in global terms rather than in reference to a particular
case, has observed that "[b]roadening of prosecution history estoppel is a corollary to the nar-
rowing of the doctrine of equivalents." Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., concurring).
81. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
82. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
83. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
84. For example, consider an applicant who, in order to distinguish his invention from a
prior art device with handles on the top, adds a limitation specifying that the claimed device
has "handles on the side." He would then be estopped from asserting that top-handles are an
equivalent of side-handles. His addition of a limitation concerning handles would not, how-
ever, estop him from asserting that indentations useful for lifting are the equivalent of handles.
Cf. Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., Inc., 782 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(limitation added to distinguish "recesses located at side" from "recesses located at bottom" do
not result in estoppel as to definition of "recess"; also noting that the examiner's rejection was
erroneously based on hindsight reconstruction.) See also Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core
& Pad Co., Inc., 1985 WL 2467 *8 (N.D. Georgia 1985) (trial court decision).
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moved from examination.85 According to these rationales, enable-
ment estoppel should be found when the prosecution history would
give an objective, informed observer (whether characterized as a rea-
sonable competitor or as one of ordinary skill in the art86) notice that
the claims do not reach certain subject matter, and where one of skill
would understand certain subject matter to have been purposefully
removed from examination. In a case in which an objective observer
could not discern, based on the prosecution history, what was surren-
dered, there will be no basis for estoppel. Thus, where an amend-
ment is made to overcome an enablement rejection, the application of
prosecution history estoppel should depend on whether the disputed
subject matter has clearly been disclaimed by the applicant.
A. Surrender ofDeterminable Scope
In thinking about enablement estoppel it is useful to differentiate
between two types of claim amendments. The first is an amendment
that removes a specific element from examination. In such a case,
the extent of the surrender will be determinable from the prosecution
history. The second type of amendment does not remove (or add) a
specific element, but instead changes the claim in a way that does not
allow what was surrendered to be specifically determined from the
prosecution history.
When the amendment specifically surrenders a claim element
that constitutes the distinction between the patented invention and the
alleged equivalent, enablement estoppel is appropriate. Consider, for
example, the light-activated sensor discussed supra in Part I.a.87 In
that example, a claim to a "sensor activated by light" was narrowed
to "a sensor activated by visible light" in order to specifically remove
ultraviolet light from the claim. It makes no difference in this case
whether the amendment was motivated by an enablement rejection
(asserting that a ultraviolet-activated sensor was not enabled by the
specification) or an art rejection (asserting that the prior art rendered
a ultraviolet-activated sensor obvious). A competitor who manufac-
tures a sensor activated by ultraviolet light, but not visible light,
should be able to rely on prosecution history estoppel to avoid a
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The ele-
ment removed by amendment (ultraviolet activation) is the focus of
the difference between the invention as originally claimed (a sensor
85. These rationales are discussed supra Part III.
86. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
87. See supra pp. 121-122.
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activated by light) and the asserted equivalent (a sensor activated by
visible light). The clear surrender of a discrete element provides the
elements required for estoppel - notice and removal of matter from
examination. In contrast, the patent holder would not be estopped
from asserting infringement against a competitor who markets a sen-
sor activated by infrared light. The amendment did not specifically
surrender infrared light (which may or may not be equivalent to visi-
ble light), but was made to address prior art or enablement issues re-
lated to ultraviolet light.
The Federal Circuit has emphasized that, when what distin-
guishes the claimed device from the allegedly infringing product is
precisely the element that the applicant surrendered to overcome a
rejection, estoppel will be found. For example, in Mannesmann De-
mag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co., Inc.8 the court found
that the patentee was estopped from claiming that a competitor's
smelting furnace vessel was equivalent to the patentee's vessel.
During prosecution, the patentee avoided an obviousness rejection by
amending the broad claim to specify that coils that formed a part of
the vessel were in "a contacting relation." In contrast, the competi-
tor's coils did not touch each other. The court observed that although
the patentee was not deprived of all equivalents to the claimed in-
vention, "the enlarged claim interpretation that [the patentee] seeks to
apply to the [competitor's product] falls squarely within the claim
scope that [the patentee] relinquished to overcome the cited refer-
ences." 9 An amendment that is unambiguous and directed to a spe-
cific element provides notice to competitors of the surrender of that
element and removes it from examination,' The range of equivalents
will to be very narrow.
It is important to note that the estoppel resulting from an en-
ablement rejection does not result because the doctrine of equivalents
88. 793 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
89. Id. at 48-49. See also Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(noting that the accused device utilized "a characteristic that the inventor had specifically
eliminated from his claim" and noting that the alleged infringer "adopted the very element that
[the inventor] had eliminated for the stated purpose of avoiding the examiner's rejection and
obtaining the patent.'); Haynes Int'l Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(estoppel supported by the fact that the element distinguishing the claimed invention and the
allegedly infringing product was also "the principle distinction between the claimed subject
matter and the prior art, and thus was the primary area of dialogue between [the applicant] and
the PTO.").
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requires equivalents to be enabled at the time of filing.90 The estop-
pel arises instead because the applicant has acquiesced to the removal
from examination of a specific, presently conceivable embodiment
and this removal would be clearly apparent to a competitor reading
the prosecution history. The applicant, having been unable to con-
vince the examiner that the subject matter encompassed by the origi-
nal claim was enabled, and having decided not to appeal the exam-
iner's decision, would not then be able to regain the original claim
scope in court.
B. Surrender ofIndeterminable Scope
In contrast to the situation in which a specific element is re-
moved from prosecution, when an enablement rejection is overcome
by an amendment that reduces the scope of a claim by degree, it may
not be possible to determine from the prosecution history what was
surrendered.
In many cases in which a genus claim, for example, is narrowed
to a specific species, the fact that some claim scope has been surren-
dered will be apparent, but the boundaries or extent of the surrender
will not be determinable from the prosecution history. In such a case,
enablement estoppel should not arise. The blood-diluent example
discussed ip Part II.b91 is an illustration of an amendment that nar-
rows a genus to a specific species. In that example, the scope of the
90. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983), made it clear
that equivalents are not limited to embodiments enabled at the time of filing. In Hughes, a
claim encompassing a ground-controlled synchronous communications satellite was held to
reach, under the doctrine of equivalents, a similar communications satellite that was controlled
by an on-board computer. Computers compact enough to be located in a satellite were not
known at the time the patent at issue was filed. Under Hughes, a future-developed technology
not known to the patent applicant can be encompassed in the patent claims. As the court
stated, "[an applicant] is not required to predict all future developments which enable the prac-
tice of his invention in substantially the same way." Id at 481.
Prosecution history estoppel was considered by the Hughes court after the defendant ar-
gued that, because the applicant had made amendments to the broad claims during prosecution,
the patent holder was precluded altogether from invoking the doctrine of equivalents. This
position, which had received some support in other circuits, was soundly rejected by the court.
Instead the court adopted the present position that the particular facts surrounding an amend-
ment must be considered. The court pointed out that the Hughes inventor "did not, of course,
surrender subject matter related to employment of an on-board computer" and so there could
be no estoppel reaching the infringing satellite having an on-board computer. Id. Hughes can
thus be distinguished from the case in which an applicant surrenders a known structure or
process to overcome an examiner's amendment, such as the surrender of ultraviolet light as an
activating source in the example given in the text. See also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (applicants cannot disclose what they do not know).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
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applicant's claim was narrowed from a genus containing at least sev-
enty species92 (metallic phosphates) to a single species (sodium phos-
phate). The applicant acquiesced to this limitation and forwent the
opportunity to rebut or appeal the examiner's position. Nonetheless
the bounds of the surrender in this instance are unclear. It is unlikely
that either the applicant or the examiner viewed the amendment as
having the force of completely relinquishing the applicant's rights to
all of the roughly sixty-nine species not literally claimed; nor would a
reasonable competitor conclude from this amendment that the re-
maining sixty-nine were disclaimed. The amendment does not pro-
vide notice to a competitor, for example, that an equivalent blood-
diluent containing potassium phosphate was disclaimed by the pat-
entee.
When genus-type claims are amended in response to an enable-
ment rejection there is often nothing in the amendment or the record
that gives clues about the extent of the applicant's surrender: a com-
petitor often will not be able to discern from the amendment what she
may make, sell, or use without infringing the patent.
In contrast to amendments made to overcome a novelty or obvi-
ousness rejection, when an amendment is prompted by an enablement
rejection no prior art documents are available to provide additional
information regarding the scope of the applicant's surrender.93 The
narrowing of a not-enabled genus provides notice that something has
been surrendered, but when the extent of that "something" cannot be
readily determined, the "notice" will not inform a competitor's deci-
sion making and will, in effect, be no notice at all.
The "adequate examination" rationale of estoppel does not pro-
vide any better justification for an estopping effect than does the
92. There are over 70 species of metallic phosphates. Coulter Elecs., Inc. v. J.T. Baker
Chem. Co., 487 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (N.D. I11. 1980).
93. An example of a court referring to the prior art is found in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There the applicant had added a
limitation reciting that a claimed purification process is carried out "at a pH from approxi-
mately 6.0 to 9.0." Id. at 1525. The Federal Circuit noted that this limitation was added to
overcome an obviousness rejection based in part on prior art that taught a similar process using
a pH above 9. The court concluded that, based on the reason for the surrender, the amendment
"surrendered pHs above 9, but does not bar [the plaintiff] from asserting equivalency to a
process ... operating sometimes at a pH below 6." Id. Judge Plager, in dissent, pointed out
that it appeared that the lower limit was also intentional because at pHs below 6.0 there would
be a "tremendous foaming problems." Id. at 1542 (Plager, J., dissenting). It appears that
Judge Plager based his conclusion on testimony given at trial rather than the file history. Id.
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"notice" rationale when the surrender is not of a specific, determin-
able, element. The removal of subject matter from examination that
results when a genus is narrowed, for example, is not analogous to
the removal that occurs when a specific element is added or removed
from a claim. Consider the blood-diluent example once more.94 One
reading of the example is that the applicant, by amending the claim,
removed sixty-nine metallic phosphates from prosecution. But such
a reading would misconceive the nature of a genus claim. A genus,
as considered during examination, is not the same as the sum of its
species. The narrowing of a genus that includes seventy species is
quite different, for example, from the situation in which a Markush
group 95 of seventy species is narrowed because an examiner asserts
that sixty-nine of the species are not enabled.96 When the genus
claim is narrowed, in contrast to the amendment narrowing the Mar-
kush group, neither the applicant nor the examiner has made a deter-
mination (or admission) that any particular species is not enabled.
More often, the issue is whether a sufficient fraction of the species in
the genus have been enabled.97 Frequently the content of the genus is
not exactly defined. It is probably accurate to characterize the appli-
cant's surrender in narrowing a genus as a surrender of nothing more
than the right to sue under a theory of literal infringement rather than
under the doctrine of equivalents.
Although the discussion above has been framed in terms of
"genus claims," it is important to keep in mind that the distinction is
not between genus and non-genus claims, but between amendments
whose extent can be readily determined (and which would apparent-
to competitors) and those that cannot. For example, where the prose-
cution history reveals that certain species or subgenera (e.g., alkaline-
earth metal-phosphates) were the focus of the enablement rejection
and subsequent amendment, enablement estoppel could reach those
species or subgenera.
94. See supra Part II.B.
95. For a description of Markush claims, see ChMSUM, supra note 13, § 8.06[2].
96. That situation would be comparable in nature, though not scale, to the examples dis-
cussed supra Part IV.B., of determinable surrenders.
97. A claim may be invalid if a significant number of inoperative species are claimed,
such that one of skill would be forced to experiment unduly in order to identify operative spe-
cies and practice the invention. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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When an enablement rejection leads to a surrender of indeter-
minable scope, no notice is provided by the amendment and specific
species are not withdrawn from examination. For these reasons, no
enablement estoppel should result from such amendments.98 How-
ever, the position that enablement estoppel should not be applied
when the bounds of the estoppel would not be clear, does not suggest
that "enablement estoppel" should not be acknowledged in appropri-
ate situations. When the scope of estoppel is clear, the argument for
enablement estoppel remains persuasive.
V. CONCLUSION.
No doctrinal or policy barriers preclude a finding of prosecution
history estoppel based on amendments made to overcome enablement
rejections. However, "enablement estoppel" should be found only in
cases in which extent of the surrender of claim scope is readily ap-
parent from the prosecution history. In general, an amendment in
which the surrendered matter is not discrete, such as amendments
that narrow a genus to a species, will not meet this requirement.
However, in cases in which the amendment removes specific subject
matter from examination and provides notice to competitors that a
surrender of specific subject matter has taken place, the application
of estoppel is warranted.
Enablement estoppel, applied appropriately, would result in a
closer correspondence between the inventor's contribution to the
art - as revealed by the specification - and the claim scope the in-
ventor can assert through the doctrine of equivalents. Such "closer
correspondence" is consistent with the axiom of the patent system
that an inventor should receive a patent for what she invents and no
more. By applying enablement estoppel only when the import and
extent of the applicant's surrender is clear, it should be possible to
provide competitors with greater understanding of what activities
they may engage in without incurring liability for infringement and,
98. To the extent that enablement estoppel would not be available in certain cases to
prevent an applicant from claiming an unenabled, unexamined embodiment under the doctrine
of equivalents, there may be alternative ways to reign in the application of the doctrine of
equivalents. A requirement that the doctrine of equivalents extend only to embodiments en-
abled by the patent specification, as suggested by Handley, supra note 41, is one possibility.
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at the same time, avoid unwise limits on a court's ability to use the
doctrine of equivalents to achieve an equitable result in specific
cases.9
99. This Article was completed in the Spring of 1996 and was in press at the time of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 65
U.S.L.W. 4162 (1997). The opinion in that case includes comments on prosecution history
estoppel that require necessarily brief comment here.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas emphasizes that prosecution history estoppel is
historically based on amendments made to avoid prior art "or otherwise to address a specific
concern... that arguably would have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable." Id.
at 4165. The Court also suggests that an important consideration in determining when estoppel
should be found is "the reasoning behind the Patent Office's insistence upon a change in the
claims." Id. at 4166. Thus, "if the PTO has been requesting changes in claim language with-
out the intent to limit equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it required
would in many cases allow for a range of equivalents, we should be extremely reluctant to up-
set the basic assumptions of the PTO.. ." Id. at 4166.
The Court's dictum in Hilton Davis must be read as reluctance to find estoppel when
amendments are made for reasons other than to avoid prior art (e.g., enablement rejections).
However, nothing in the language of the decision appears to preclude a finding of enablement
estoppel in all circumstances, e.g., when it is clear that changes required by the Patent Office
were understood to limit the scope of equivalents.
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